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Veterans, Agriculture, and Monetization in the Late Roman Republic
Abstract
In Ancimt Literaq William V. Harris argued that the Greeks and Romans never achieved mass literacy in part
because they lacked an "essential instrument," that is "an extensive netwotk of schools ... subsidized by religion
or by the state."2 The Romans did, however, have one large and very well ~ded educational institution: the
army. Though it may never have taught reading and writing,3 the Roman anny was constantly training tens of
thousands of soldiers in the arts of war.4 But the anny was more than an institution, it was also a community
with its own special rules, traditions and procedures. 5 In addition to learning how to fight, a recruit had to
learn how to live in his new military environment: Scholars have long recognized the anny's important role in
the acculturation or 'Romanization' of auxiliaries.6 In 'this paper I want to consider how anny life taught
soldiers to use money, that is, how exposure to the military community may have altered economic behavior.
The army, I would like to suggest, taught soldiers a style of 'household management' or money use that was
risky when ptacticed by fanners. Since in the first century B.C.E. the Romans typically settled veterans on the
land where they were presumably expected to engage in agriculture, the military's inadvertent instruction may
have contributed to the political and economic difficulties of the age, particularly debt crisis.
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Veterans, Agriculture, and Monetization 
in the Late Roman Republic* 
W~ Jhould it be supposed that ... small formers should have been mrm successful ... 
but for defects derived from their having .senJtd in the army11 
In Ancimt Literaq William V. Harris argued that the Greeks and Romans 
never achieved mass literacy in part because they lacked an "essential 
instrument," that is "an extensive netwotk of schools ... subsidized by religion 
or by the state."2 The Romans did, however, have one large and very well 
~ded educational institution: the army. Though it may never have taught 
reading and writing,3 the Roman anny was constantly training tens of 
thousands of soldiers in the arts of war.4 But the anny was more than an 
institution, it was also a community with its own special rules, traditions and 
procedures. 5 In addition to learning how to fight, a recruit had to learn how 
to live in his new military environment: Scholars have long recognized the 
anny's important role in the acculturation or 'Romanization' of auxiliaries.6 In 
'this paper I want to consider how anny life taught soldiers to use money, that 
is, how exposure to the military community may have altered economic 
behavior. The army, I would like to suggest, taught soldiers a style of 
'household management' or money use that was risky when ptacticed by 
fanners. Since in the first century B.C.E. the Romans typically settled 
veterans on the land where they were presumably expected to engage in 
agriculture, the military's inadvertent instruction may have contributed to the 
• Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Social Science 
History Association, 26-29 October, Pittsburgh, and at the 471h Annual Missouri Valley History 
Conference, 4-6 March, 2004, Omaha. I would like to thank the audiences and my fellow panelist.s 
for their useful comments and suggestions. Unless otherwise noted, transhrions come from the 
Loeb Classical Library editions. 
I Brunt 1962, 82. 
z Harris 1989,15. 
l Haynes 1999, 171-72. 
4 Goldsworthy 1999, 209. 
s Goldsworthy and Haynes 1999. 
6 Haynes 1999, 165. 
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political and economic difficulties of the age, particularly debt crisis. 
Debt crisis repeatedly afflicted the Roman world in the late Republic. 
Significant crises occurred from 89 to 86, in 63, and from 49 to 47 B.C.E.7 
Though quantitative evidence describing these crises is nonexistent, one can 
still identify with some confidence their causes. Often Roman debt crises can 
be linked closely to warfare, particularly to the conflicts which took place on 
Italian soil during the last 60 years of the Republic. Warfare in Italy would 
quickly upset the credit structure which depended heavily on the value of 
land, the security for most loans.8 Warfare brought an increased demand for 
coinage and thus drove up interest rates as creditors began to call in their 
debts, taking money out of circulation. Those debtors who lacked cash were 
forced to borrow &om others at a higher rate or sell property to remain 
solvent However, since warfare usually entailed the widespread destruction 
of property as well as, frequently, the confiscation and redistribution of land, 
real estate prices tended to fall dramatically at even the rumor of war. Thus 
for many Romans war inevitably brought about the financial and social ruin of 
bankruptcy. 
For the crises of the 80s and 40s, warfare in Italy no doubt provides 
sufficient explanation. The debt crisis of the 80s followed the devastation of 
the Social War and coincided, as did the crisis of the 40s, with a major civil 
war. The Romans were certainly aware of the relationship between war and 
debt crisis. Shortly after Caesar invaded Italy in 49, Cicero joked that no one 
had ever done more to lower real estate prices in Italy than Pompey.9 
What, however, caused the debt crisis of 63? Italy had been relatively 
peaceful since the end of the slave revolt in 71 and yet Cicero reports that 
"indebtedness was never greater."10 While Cicero was certainly not above 
exaggerating the difficulties with which he contended during his consulship, a 
number of other sources indicate that Rome faced a major debt crisis in the 
mid 60s. Sallust writes that as early as 66 some Romans were contemplating 
revolution because of the harsh burden of debt. 11 Plutarch tells us that Cato 
the Younger fought against debt relief proposals in 64,12 and we learn from 
Dio that a tribune proposed the cancellation of debts at the beginning of 63.13 
In the fall of 63 Catiline, heavily in debt following two unsuccessful bids 
for the consulship, attempted 'to capitalize on this situation. He organb:ed a 
7 Caes., B. Civ. 3.1 and 3.20-21; Cic., Att. 7.18.4; Dio Cass. 37.25, 41.37-38, 4222, and 4250-51; 
Plut, Cats. 12.2-4 and 37.2; Val. Max. 4.8.3. 
s Barlow 1980, 212-13. 
9 Cic., Att. 7.17.1. 
10 Cic., Off. 2.84. 
1t Sail., Cat. 14-18. 
12 Plut., Cat. Min. 18. 
u Dio Cass. 37.25. 
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conspiracy and attempted to overthrow the government, protruSmg 
supporters that he would abolish debts and redistribute wealth and offices. 
However, Cicero uncovered Catiline's plans and successfully thwarted the 
conspiracy. The rebels were defeated in Etruria early in 62. Contemporary 
observers clearly believed that debt crisis brought on the conspiracy and 
uptising.14 Soon after the crisis Cicero, who had just bought an expensive 
house from Crassus, joked that he himself was now in debt and interested in 
joining a conspiracy.15 
But who joined Catiline's conspiracy? Apparendy his cause was 
particularly popular with Sulla's veterans, 16 thousands of whom had been 
settled on confiscated Italian land in the late 80s. 17 
Judging from contemporary accounts Sulla's veterans seem to have been 
lousy farmers. Sallust and Cicero both report that by the mid-60s many of 
them had either lost the land on which they had been settled or were heavily 
in debt.18 Both writers attribute the veterans' support for Cariline to their 
economic plight. Appian and Plutarch also emphasize that Sullan veterans, 
«who had squandered the gains of their former life of plunder," constituted a 
large portion of Catiline's supponers.19 Ancient writers, of course, .attributed 
the economic failure of these veterans to moral deficiencies. They were 
spendthrifts, lazy and addicted to luxury.w Successful farmers, on the other 
hand, worked hard throughout the year and avoided all unnecessary 
expenditures. Modern historians came to dismiss these moralizing 
explanations and used to suggest that these veterans were either inexperienced 
fanners or had no interest in fanning at all, renting or quickly selling the land 
allotted to them.21 More recendy, however, scholars have begun to doubt that 
veterans were any more likely than anyone else to fail at farming or go 
bankrupt.22 They pointed out that most soldiers were recruited from mral 
areas and were thus unlikely to be ignorant of agriculture.23 In addition P.A. 
Brunt noted that most of Sulla's veterans had served in the army for only a 
few years, not long enough to have grown soft from exposure to eastern 
14 Sall., Cat.16.4;Cic., Cat. 2.7.16-21. Cf. also Andreau 1999,103 and Giovaaaini 1995,15. 
n Cic., Fam. 5.6.2. 
16 Cic., M11r. 49; Cic., Cat. 2.20; Sall., Cat. 16; App., B. Civ. 2.2. However Harris 1971, 269 and 291 
and de Blois 2000, 14 doubt that many Sullaa veterans fought for Catiline. 
17 Brunt 1971, 305. 
1s Sall., Cat. 16.4; Cic., Cat. 2.7.21. 
19 App., B. Civ. 2.2; Plut., G: 14.2. 
20 Cf., for example, Sall., Cat. 10.2 .. 
21 Gabba 1976, 47;Brunt 1971, 309; Keppie 1983,123-27. 
22 Brunt 1962, 82; Brunt 1971, 309 suggested that "the extent to which the Sullan veterans failed 
may be exaggerated;" cf. also Harris 1971, 267-71 . 
2~ Brunr 1962, 75; Skydsgaard 1980, 70. 
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luxury during the campaign against Mithridates.24 Besides, imperial era 
settlements demonstrated that veterans might farm successfully even after 
serving in the army for 25 years.25 If, on the other hand, veterans tended to 
sell their allotments immediately or employ tenants, there could be no 
connection between their agricultural abilities and indebtedness. While some 
Sullan veterans were certainly in financial trouble, it has also been argued that 
they were simply an easy target. Since many hated the veterans for the part 
they played in the civil war, proscriptions and confiscations, it made good 
rhetorical sense to play up their involvement with Catiline.26 Uncertainty 
concerning the size, location, and quality of allotments has also served to 
complicate the picture. v Sallust, for example, has Lepidus, consul in 78, 
describe Sulla's veterans as ''banished to swamps and woods."28 Obviously if 
veterans had been given marginal land, they would be unlikely to succeed. 
The nexus of unresolved questions surrounding the Catilinari~n 
conspiracy makes it almost impossible to say anything definitive about the 
make-up of Catiline's faction or the motives and economic circumstances of 
his supporters. Whatever the relative numbers, it is clear that people from 
many different backgrounds and situations followed Cariline, and it was never 
particularly difficult for anyone to go into debt in the ancient world. 
Nevertheless it is worth exploring the possibility that Roman writers 
observed- but misinterpreted- the symptoms of a 'defect derived from army 
service.' 
Sociologists refer to the idea that working in a particular occupation can 
affect a person's subsequent social or economic accomplishments as the 
'bridging hypothesis.' Military service provides "an environment in which the 
individual may acquire new sldlls and abilities which ... could help him in his 
civilian career."29 Through the statistical analysis of surveys and 
questionnaires scholars have tested the bridging hypothesis with respect to 
U.S. veterans of all major conflicts from World War II to the present. Studies 
regularly find significant differences between veterans and non-veterans with 
respect to economic and educational attainment, attitudes and even self-
esteem. However these differences do not always favor veterans. For 
example, although it has been observed that there is a consistent "positive 
effect of military service on the status attainment of veterans" from World 
War II and the Korean War,30 an educational deficit exists for veterans of the 
24 Brunt 1971,310. 
25 Brunt 1962, 83. 
u Harris 1971, 291. 
27 Gabba 1976, 45; and Harris 1971, 259. 
28 Sail., Oralio Ltpidi 23; c( also Cic., Leg. Agr. 2.70; and Tac., A1111. 1.17. 
:w Browning et al. 1973, 7 6; cf. also Lakhani 1998. 
JOTeachman and Call1996, 2. 
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Vietnam War and the all-volunteer force.31 
While it is obviously impossible to conduct similar studies on Roman 
veterans, it seems reasonable to expect that differences would develop 
between veterans and non-veterans in the Roman world because of the 
substantial differences between economic life on a fann and in the army. 
Anny life brought about the 'resociali.zation' of the recruit as he adapted to his 
new environment and learnt new skills.32 One of the major differences 
between the rural agricultural economy and life in the Roman army was the 
level of monetization. Although the Roman countryside was not, as 
archaeologists and numismatists once supposed, essentially unmonetized, it 
still seems safe to assert that far more coins circulated in towns and army 
camps than .in rural areas.33 Fanners used coins for some purchases, but 
typically employed a range of commodities in their transactions.34 
The army, by contrast, ran on cash. "Soldiers and money," Julius Caesar 
supposedly once remarked, "if you lack one, you will soon lack the other."35 
Roman soldiers received a relatively modest salary in cash from which certain 
deductions were made, but their income could be supplemented by donatives 
from their generals and, perhaps most importandy, from the sale of booty. 
Merchants and tr~ders as well as prostitutes and astrologers regularly followed 
Roman armies, buying the spoils of victory and selling products and services 
to the soldiers. 36 Sallust tells of a Roman anny in North Africa whose soldiers 
"sold the grain which was allotted them by the state and bought bread from 
day to day."37 As Claude Nicolet, commenting on the Republican army, 
observed: "Commercial and military activity were not sharply opposed ... 
Pillage and commerce were two complimentary and interconnected methods 
of exchange and ... it was a long time before the ancient world established a 
clear distinction between them."38 
Anny life must have quickly habituated soldiers to the use of coinage and 
the practice of liquidating assets such as grain, slaves and catde in exchange 
for cash.~9 This sort of economic behavior was advantageous in a soldier but 
31 Cohen et aL 199 5, 88. 
32 Broom and Smith 1963, 323. 
33 Howgego 1992, 20. 
34 Cato, Agr. 2.5 and 5.3-4; cf. also Forbes and Foxball1995, 79; and de Ligt 1991, 75. 
JS Dio Cass. 42.49.5 (translated by Frederiksen 1966, 132). 
36 Roth 1999, 96-101; and Phang 2001, 246-47. 
37 Sall., l 11g. 44. While S~ust does not explicidy state that coinage was used for these transactions, 
the use of vendm and m6rtari implies monetized behavior especially since they are contrasted with 
m11faN which appears in the previous clause. 
38 Nicolet 1980, 122. 
39 Livy emphasizes the need for soldiers to sell their booty lest the army be slowed down (1 0.17.4) 
or the soldiers be distracted from fighting (10.20.16). Polybius 10.16 describes the procedures used 
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dangerous in a fanner.40 The soldier needed mobility and could usually 
depend on a steady supply of coins and food Fanners, however, did not have 
the state's financial and logistical support behind them. The strategy of the 
successful fanner was to amass a diversified portfolio of assets, in particular 
grain, oil and wine. 41 These commodities could be sold when prices were 
high, consumed in times of food shortage, exchanged for labor and goods, or 
lent to other fanners. Even Cato and Varro, who were probably writing for 
the 'commercial fanner', emphasize the importance of long-term storage on a 
fann.42 Although ancient and modern depictions of the Roman fanner as 
highly self-sufficient are idealizing exaggerations, the Roman farmer was 
certainly much more self-reliant than the Roman soldier. By maintaining 
stores of several commodities the fanner insulated himself from the monetary 
economy. Consider:ing how dramatically prices, especially the prices of 
foodstuffs, tended to fluctuate, for a farmer to rely too heavily on coinage 
could be financially disastrous. 
The late Republic was a crucial moment in Rome's monetary history. 
Whatever the precise figures for coin production may be, it is clear that the 
money supply grew d.tamaticaJly from the mid-second to the mid-first century 
and that not all of this new coinage simply replaced the non-Roman issues 
being .removed from circulation by Roman imperialism.43 As Keith Hopkins 
suggested, "money percolated into a myriad of transactions which had 
previously been embedded in the subsistence economy."44 Since cities were. 
already monetized, money was percolating into a myriad of rural transactions. 
Veterans were no doubt instrumental in this process of .rural monetization but 
the transformation of the agricultural economy would not have been smooth. 
The adoption of new monetary practices by established farmers as well as the 
application of such practices to an unfamiliar environment by veterans would 
inevitably cause difficulties as there were no exempla to guide either group. 
to deal with the collection and sale of booty and stresses (10.17) bow important it was that the 
Roman system assured each soldier his share. 
<a Cato and Varro, our best sources for lace Republican agriculture, were more concerned with 
profit than subsistence and their manuals do not, of course, accurately reflect the conditions and 
strategies of most Roman farmers. However Cato does recommend (~. 2.7) that the farmer be a 
seller, not a buyer, and his references to rdlwne.r" .. jmmentariam.. . tinariam, okariam (2.5) and a/lam 
okariam, vinariam (3.2) suggest the importance of diversified assets even for those seeking profit. 
Similarly, though Varro often refers to cash crops and occasionally implies monoculture (e.g. R.mt 
1.16 and 3.16.10-11), he frequendy praises self-sufficient behavior (1.59.2 and 2.4.3) and counsels 
against the purchase of. goods that can be raised or produced on the farm (1.22). 
41 Forbes and Foxhall 1995, 69-86. Cf. also l.icb 1993, 268; and Rosenstein 2004, 16. 
42 Cato, Agr. 3.2; and Varro, RNst. 1.69. 
43 Crawford 1974, 672; Hopkins 1980, 107; Backendorf 1998, 542; Buttrey 1999, 532; and Lockyear 
1999,241. 
44 Hopkins 1980, 110. 
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Studies of the monetization of rural India suggest a close relationship between 
increased money use and indebtedness. John Mellor, for example, notes that 
''Monetization undoubtedly turned many inexperienced Indians into 
debtors."45 Joan Frayn has described one aspect of this problem. "Before the 
introduction of a monetary system," she argues, the subsistence farmer 
"would have repaid in kind at the next harvest. N ow he must pay in cash and 
with mterest. The price of the borrowed grain would be fixed in the time of 
scarcity, not at the harvest."46 Such unfavorable borrowing conditions would 
have forced more fanners into bankruptcy. \Vhile Roman veterans may not 
have been subsistence fanners, they would be at the mercy of the same 
relendess process, especially if their economic behavior continued to resemble 
that of soldiers. It is not the use of coinage per se that would cause trouble for 
some veterans but the failw:e to maintain a diversified store of commodities 
or too great a willingness to speculate. It would have been difficult for many 
veterans to give up the monetary habits army life had drilled into them. 
The Romans themselves seem to have been aware of the problems posed 
by the reintegration of veterans into the agricultural economy and made some 
efforts to deal with them. There were laws prohibiting the sale of a veteran's 
land allotment for as many as twenty years.47 Such measures would limit the 
amount of money veterans could borrow smce a farm th~t could not be 
alienated presumably could not be used as security for a loan. Restricting the 
sale of land would, in theory, discourage risky financial behavior by veterans. 
Unfortunately these measures were apparendy often ignored or overturned. 48 
The obvious solution was to substitute a discharge bonus in cash for the 
customary allotment of land. According to Dio, Augustus made this change, 
although not because of the difficulties facmg veteran fanners but in order to 
assure soldiers of a definite reward for service and to avoid upsetting those 
whose land might be confiscated.49 
The relationship between money-use, agriculture and veteran setdement 
policies in the Roman world is complex. While army service may have put 
some Romans at a disadvantage when they later turned to agriculture, several. 
o ther factors may have also contributed. For example, veterans must often 
have been given land far from the areas m which they grew up. Cato and 
•s Mellor eta!. 1968, 61; cf. also Chandavarkar 1977. 
46 Frayn 1979, 78. It is possible that loans in kind could legally charge higher rates of interest (cf. 
Billeter 1898, 288-305) but a good ruuvest would allow the repayment of even exorbitant interest in 
kind. Those in debt for money, however, were at the mercy of both the weather and the market 
price of their produce. 
47 App., B. Civ. 3.2 and 3.7. 
48 Cic., Leg. Agr. 2.78; and App., B. Civ. 3.2. 
49 Dio Cass. 54.25.5. However Brunt 1962, 83 notes that according to Tac., Ann. 1.17 Augustus 
was still giving land to some veterans in 14 C.E. Cf. also Keppie 1983, 208-9. 
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Varro both note that there were a variety of distinct topographical, ecological, 
and climatic situations within Italy.50 Someone who had farmed successfully 
in one region might fail in another if he did not adapt to local circumstances. 
Furthermore, even though, as I noted earlier, most recruits probably came 
from a rural background, the abandonment of property qualifications for 
army service in the late second century must have meant that fewer soldiers in 
the first century would have had prior experience running their own farm 
households. While they may have worked in the fields as hired hands or 
seasonal laborers, they would still lack the necessary household management 
skills since military service had interrupted their agricultural apprenticeship. 51 
Veterans might also fail through the lack of a local support network. As 
the Roman agricultural manuals indicate, farmers depended on their local 
communities for supplies, craftsmen, workers, markets and loans.52 Veteran 
fanners, perhaps settled far from their original homes amid a terrified or 
resentful 'indigenous' population, would have to forge anew the complex 
relationships and arrangements that the locals could take for granted. Perhaps 
this hdps explain why Caesar began to settle veterans in their units, so that 
they could continue to rdy on their comrades for assistance. 53 
Evidence for the economic behavior of soldiers and veterans in the late 
Republic is not abundant and it is impossible to prove definitively that military 
service put veterans at an economic disadvantage. Such a causal relationship 
does, however, seem plausible. As scholars begin to inco:rporate the 
phenomenon of monetization into more diachronic accounts of the Roman 
economy, it makes sense to consider carefully the means by which people 
changed their monetary habits. The army taught many Romans how to fight; 
perhaps it also taught them how to buy and sell. Still, as Columdla 
subsequendy noted, the Romans lacked one important kind of educational 
institution: ' 'There are to this day schools for rhetoricians and... for 
mathematicians and musicians ... training schools for ... the seasoning of food 
and dressers of the head and hair .. . but of agriculture I know neither sdf-
professed teachers nor pupils."54 
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